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Large-scale investments in transport infrastructure have been traditionally 
evaluated assuming the equivalence between direct and indirect economic 
effects (Jara-Diaz,1986), which is only correct under -generally non-
guaranteed- perfect competition assumptions. Despite this common practice 
there is still no consensus amongst economists as to how the benefits and costs 
of large infrastructure projects should be determined. The discussions 
regarding the desirability, for instance, of the Betuwe railway line, the fifth 
runway at Schiphol Airport, the North-South underground railway in 
Amsterdam etc. are illustrative of this. The focus has been, in particular, on the 
magnitude of ‘indirect’ and ‘strategic’ effects, that is effects on parties other 
than the direct users of the infrastructure (indirect effects) and those factors 
that have a favorable effect on the long-term development of the (regional) 
economy, such as effects relating to firm location and demographics (strategic 
effects). Focusing on general equilibrium, increasing returns and imperfect 
competition modeling approach this paper aims to throw light on this subject 
matter by examining how the social benefits in terms of efficiency resulting 
from improvements to the infrastructure can be determined in an imperfect 
regional economy.  
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Until the beginnings of the previous decade, the link between transport infrastructure, 
space and economic activity in economics was somehow weak, especially in terms of 
theoretical work. Despite an early recognition of the subject by A.Smith -in relation with 
the expansion of market size- neither he nor any other classical economist made any 
sustained reference to the spatial dimension of economic life and its consequences. As 
has been pointed out recently by Martin (2003), this “space-less” view of the economy 
was barely challenged by A.Marshall while introducing the concept of industrial 
districts
1. Despite an interesting potential for further development, Marshall’s 
contribution was not successful in attracting enough attention from his contemporaries in 
a way to transform the subject from a curiosity to a formal line of research. As a 
consequence this important potential branch of economics was basically ignored 
afterwards.   
                                                 
1 Industrial districts are seen nowadays as the origins of clustering theory. See Porter (1980).   
In the middle of the last century the situation started to change. In the context of a post-
war world economy and mainly within development economics, infrastructure 
investments began to acquire a sense of significance as a main determinant of long-run 
growth, as was claimed by development economists such Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and 
Hirschman (1958). In particular, Tinbergen (1957) addressed directly the relation 
between immediate benefits to traffic –direct effects- arising from a reduction in transport 
costs and the resulting final change in GDP. While these efforts were more of an isolated 
nature, the prolific production of evidence after Aschauer (1989) supporting a link 
between public infrastructure –especially core infrastructure- and productivity in the U.S. 
were definitely not. The surprisingly high rates of returns on public infrastructure 
investment implied by Aschauer findings originated a renovated interest on the link 
between infrastructure and growth at an empirical level and particularly on the spatial 
structure of the economy with a theoretical emphasis. Concerning transport infrastructure, 
this interest is reflected in a burgeoning literature on its impacts on the economy (see 
Rietveld and Bruinsma, 1998 for an overview) as well as a proliferation of a large variety 
of methods to estimate them (Rietveld and Nijkamp, 2000; Lakshmanan and Anderson, 
2002).  
 
Within this wave of research is remarkable the proclivity to use general equilibrium 
models based on increasing returns, product differentiation and monopolistic 
competition. The so-called new economic geography (NEG) models are specially 
positioned to analyze the trade-off between dispersal and agglomeration -or centrifugal 
and centripetal- forces that arise when increasing returns to scale characterize a 
proportion of economic activity. In essence this modeling framework provides an 
economic explanation of the spatial structure of the economy. The link between this kind 
of modeling and large-scale investment in transport infrastructure seems to arise from the 
combination of the role of transport cost on the spatial distribution of economic activity 
under economies of scale and the obvious link between transport infrastructure 
improvements and transport costs reductions (Fernandez-Texeira, 2002). Nowadays, the 
use of NEG modeling in location and agglomeration analysis is widespread in theoretical 
literature, unless is not so in empirical work (Oosterhaven and Knaap 2002; Venables and 
Gasoriek, 1999). Despite that, there is significant lack of work concerning the analysis of 
efficiency of agglomeration outcomes in general and welfare effects within this modeling 
approach in particular
2. In order to clarify the implications of transport improvements on 
the economy, both at theoretical and empirical levels in this paper we depart from the 
canonical NEG model to analysis the implications of traditional transport cost-benefit 
analysis. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section the 
description of the basic model is carried out and some extensions both on the demand and 
supply side are discussed. In section three simulations based on different parameters 
values are discussed. Both symmetric and asymmetric conditions between regions are 
taken into consideration. Section forth elaborates over possible extensions and finally 
conclusions are discussed in a final section.  
 
 
                                                 
2 For the former see Charlot et. al (2003). 




In this section we describe the theoretical model used for simulations. This is basically 
the canonical core-periphery model (Fujita et. al 2000, Baldwin et. al 2003).  The 
discussion is carried out for the general case of r regions. For simulations we consider a 2 
x 2 x 2 setting, that is, the economy space is composed of two regions, it has two sectors 
of production (modern and traditional sectors) and there are two production factors 
(qualified and non-qualified labor). In a second stage of research we would consider 





In the general case, we consider an economy of n-regions with two sectors of production, 
one producing traditional goods under constant returns and the other producing 
manufactures (nr-varieties in each region) under increasing returns to scale. Production is 
carried out only based on labor, but this factor can be of a qualified or non-qualified 
nature. All workers are also final consumers and share the same basic Cobb-Douglas 
preferences for the two basic types of goods a la Dixit-Stiglitz: 
 
,
1 µ µ − = r r r T M U           ( 1 )  
 
where M represents the composite index of manufacture goods, T is the consumption of 
traditional good (e.g. agricultural), and µ represents the expenditure share of 
manufactured good in consumption. The subscript r reflex the fact that utility is measure 
at a regional level aggregating all consumers without distinguish between qualified and 
non-qualified workers. The consumption of manufactures is described by a constant 
elasticity of substitution sub-utility function defined over a continuum of varieties of 
manufactured goods, m(i), with a range of varieties described by n. The preference for 














r r di i m M       with    0 > ρ  >  1     (2) 
 
For convenience we use ρ to define the elasticity of substitution between a pair of 
varieties as σ. Whenever σ increases the substitution between a pair of manufactured 




                                                 
3 We assume that this elasticity is the same in all regions. Additionally we rule out for the moment the 














In each region consumers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint. Since all 
consumers are identical in preferences final demand will be the same for all of them 
differing only in terms of sources of income. We then assume that there is a 
representative consumer in each region meaning that the relevant income includes all 
sources of wages in a region, that is, manufacture or traditional production based wages
4. 
If preferences were quasi-linear aggregation is not a problem but with CES preferences 
well-behaved aggregation is not assured to hold.  Defining income in a region by Y we 
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The utility maximization problem can be solved in two steps. First, for any value of the 
composite M, each m(i) have to be chosen so as to minimize the cost of attaining it. This 
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r r di i m M      (4) 
 
The first order condition for this expenditure minimization problem establish the equality 
of marginal rates of substitution to price ratios for any pair of varieties and consequently 
implies an expression for the consumption of a particular variety (e.g. m(j)), that   
replaced in the constraint in (4) finally brings an expression for the compensated demand 
of this particular variety as in (5), 
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The term in the denominator in normally regarded as a price index for the manufactured 
products consumed in r, denoted here by G in (6). This index measures the minimum cost 
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4 See Mas-Colell et al (1997) Ch. 4 for a discussion on aggregation. 
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In a second stage we can solve the original problem of utility maximization, where 
consumers divide total income between traditional and composite manufactures. This is a 
typical Cobb-Douglas maximization problem leading to uncompensated demands in the 
form of income over price times the expenditure share of the good in total consumption, 
as in (9).   
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For each variety of manufactures in the region the demand can be derived as (10), in 
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Under these conditions an expression for the indirect utility function can be obtained. 
This expression is the base for welfare analysis within this model. Since all consumers 
share the same preference structure, this expression is valid for all workers in a region as 
well. 
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Before describing producer behavior we introduce the spatial dimension in the model 
explicitly through transport cost. The explicit modeling of a transport sector -with or 
without distinguishing between different modes- is ruled out at this stage and we stick to 
the usual indirect way of modeling assuming iceberg type cost of transportation a la 
Samuelson, in which in order to put one unit of a manufactured good from region r in 
region s, τ
Drs units of the good should be send, implying that only 1/τ
Drs will actually 
  5arrive after traveling Drs units of distance
5. In a model of only two regions the price of a 
variety produced in region r and consumed in s will be: 
 
rs r rs p p τ =             
 














n sr rr r di p di p G        ( 1 2 )  
 
Further more, to simplify computations –without compromising results- we can assume 
that in each region the price for each variety is the same, then (12) become easier to 
handle: 
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Then, aggregate consumption demanded by consumers in location s for a product 
produced in r now follows from (10): 
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From the point of view of producers, providing this amount of manufacture for 
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In a two region model the market demand for variety i for producer in region r is given: 
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Now we can turn to the specific modeling of producer behavior. The production of the 
quantities in (16) requires Cr units of labor, where Fr > 0 and cr >0 are respectively the 
fixed and the marginal labor requirements. Production of any variety exhibits increasing 
returns to scale internal to the firm
7.  
 
                                                 
5 In a network economy with more than two regions it must be recognized that increasing returns to scale  
are normally present in the transport of goods, as was pointed out by Marshall in the case of maritime 
transport  (McConville, 1999). 
6 We are assuming here that no transport cost have to be incurred for trade within regions but this can be 
modified to incorporated in-region transport infrastructure improvements. 
7 It is also possible to model increasing returns to scale external to the firm. 
  6r r r r q c F C + =      r   =   1 ,   2        ( 1 6 )  
The profit function of each firm located in region r is therefore: 
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Where the demand faced is taken from (15). From (16) the equilibrium price can be 
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In the particular case of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition assumption, the “large 
group” assumption concerning competitors is assumed, and then εr corresponds to σ. In 
this version of our model we rule out strategic interaction between producers when 
σ ε = r .  This assumption implies that price for variety i is above marginal cost just by a 
constant mark-up, as in (18). 
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Assuming free-entry of competitor’s profits will go to zero and we can derive an 
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Using (19) we can derive the cost incurred in equilibrium, and use this to find the total 
demand of labor in each region as in (20) 
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Some normalization in parameters can be taken in order to simplify the model and its 
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Using the zero profit condition, this implies that: 
 
r r w p =    r = 1,2 ;  1 = r q     r = 1,2 
 
As mentioned before in this model nominal wages adjust until no firm enters or exits the 
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This is nonlinear in wr, meaning that no analytical solutions can be obtained then 
numerical solutions are the rule in this model. A spatial equilibrium in this case is the 
final result of the interplay between agglomeration and dispersion forces and is 
characterized in the literature as the situation where skilled worker have no additional 
incentives to change location. The equilibrium depends heavily on the transport cost level 
(Krugman, 1991) and can be formally denoted by an “excess” indirect utility a skilled 
worker enjoy in region i = 1,2, a spatial equilibrium arises at λ between (0,1) when, 
 





Since we are interested in a CBA analysis comparison based traditional evaluation 
approach and a more general approach that uses broad welfare measures that take care of 
general equilibrium effects, we should first derived a transport demand to compute the 
first CBA type and afterwards decide which welfare measure use to compute CBA of the 
second type. 
 
Expression (22) can be seen as a derived demand for transport services corresponding to 
variety i . The valid range of values for τ in this derived demand is obtained as the range 
                                                 
8 A more extensive explanation of the approach followed to measure welfare change and to compare it to 
traditional CBA is given in an appendix. 
  8in which the general equilibrium of the model sustains dispersion equilibriums
9. To 
account for the total welfare effect in the transport using consumption, we have to 
multiply the change in consumer surplus by the proportion of varieties consumed in the 
corresponding region meaning the analysis can be equivalently be carried out over the 
aggregate derived transport demand for variety i in region r. 
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For the second type of CBA analysis mentioned we make use of Hicksians measures of 
welfare (e.g equivalent and compensate variations). Corresponding expressions can be 
derived starting with the indirect utility function in (11). The following two relations 
implicitly define an expression for the equivalent (EV) and compensate (CV) variations, 
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0 1 ) , ( U CV Y V = − τ  
 
where U
i  indicate the level of utility depending on the stage, that is, in the original 
situation before the change in transport cost and in the final situation after the change 
respectively. Combining these conditions with (11) a pair of explicit expressions for the 
EV and CV can be derived, for instance, for the equivalent variation, 
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The welfare analysis is completed when these two measures of economy-wide welfare 
are compared with the traditional consumer surplus change arising from a cost-benefit 
analysis. This comparison is conducted by calculating the ratio of EV over CS. This ratio 
should be equal or greater than one when considering a reduction in transport costs (by a 
                                                 
9 A discussion regarding type and number of equilibriums in core-periphery type models can be found in 
Baldwin et al (2003). 
  9reduction in τ). A ration greater than one implies the presence of indirect effects not taken 
into account in traditional CBA.  
 
III. Simulations   
 
As a first set of simulations we run the two region version of the model under two 
different schemes
10. The first one is characterized by symmetry between regions, that is, 
both regions are exactly the same then trade arise just because of the ‘love of variety’ 
nature of the model whenever transport cost are high or low enough to generate a 
dispersion equilibrium. The second type is characterized by the presence of asymmetry 
between regions arising from a different endowment of non-mobile labor and also 
keeping the same total amount as in the first simulations but allowing a different 
distribution of this type of input between regions. This second case can be interpreted as 
an exogenous differentiation of regions between a core (urban) and a periphery (rural) as 




Under symmetry several simulations where carried out changing two main parameters in 
the model, that is, elasticity of substitution between regions and the share of expenditure 
in manufactures per region
11. Figures 1 and 2 show a representative case. In this case σ 
=5 and µ = 0.4. The change in welfare measured in CS (as in traditional CBA), EV and 
CV is shown. A first case of significant transport infrastructure improvement (from a 
Tmax = 3) is shown in Fig.1.  Figure 2 corresponds to the case where transport cost is 
reduced 10%.   
 










































                
 
 
                                                 
10 All simulations are run using Mathematica  
11 We assume at this point symmetry in all these parameters.  
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Results are shown for all the range of transport costs but are especially relevant between 
T-break (1.63) and T-sustain (1.806). Fig.1 shows that welfare impacts arising from big 
reductions in transport costs are still well capturing by a traditional CBA for high values 
of transport costs as well as for intermediate values showing multiple equilibrium. For 
small changes in these costs the difference between welfare measures is smaller but 
shows a sudden increase in the multiple equilibrium range. The ratio between EV and CS 
is shown in Fig.1.b and Fig.2.b. Under an idealized setting such as symmetric economy, 
CBA practice is still giving appropriate results.   
 
In the range where only agglomeration survives the relevancy of traditional CBA can not 
be appropriately evaluated since the only trade possible consists in imports of 
manufactured goods by traditional sector workers in the periphery. In the figures, as can 
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  11Asymmetry 
 
A region’s economic size depends on how much qualified and non-qualified labor it has. 
Since non-qualified labor is mobile and its interregional division is endogenous, intrinsic 
size asymmetries must come from different endowments of the immobile factor or 
different distribution of this factor within regions. To this end, we assume either that the 
two regions are endowed with different stocks of this factor and further more, one region 
(rural region) is ‘bigger’ in the sense that L*=L+ε with  ε>0, or that this factor is 
distributed different than evenly (phi not 0,5). Introducing asymmetries makes necessary 
to distinguish the effects between regions. 
 
Under the same parameter values results change considerably. First, the Tomahawk 
figure for this economy is shown in Fig. 5; now T-break is equal to 1.822 while T-sustain 
changes to 1.906. Under these more realistic conditions CS is always overestimating 
economy-wide welfare impacts. Results are also sensitive to the conditions of 
competition in the market (measured by σ) and the proportion of expenses in 
manufacturing goods. This result is in line with Puga (1999) results –despite a three 
region environment is considered there- since suggest that an improved transport link can 
harm an already disadvantaged region. 
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   Fig. 3b             Fig. 4b 
 
 
    Fig. 5. Tomahawk with asymmetry (Tbreak=1.822; Tsust=1.908) 












  13IV.  Some Possible Extensions  
 
The present model is focus on numerical exercises since its structure makes prohibitive to 
work at an analytical level. Despite that, and as many authors have shown already in the 
literature (Baldwin et al 2003), it is possible to work with other versions of NEG models 
that can be solved analytically and in some cases allow to address in better form 
questions like the ones raised in this paper. This kind of extensions is left for future work 
but here we make some suggestions. Extensions to the basic core-periphery model can be 
classified according to which market and which side of this market affect. 
 
Final Goods Demand  
 
First, we should recognize that utility function does not have to be identical across 
individuals, especially when comparing agricultural and manufacturing workers. 
Secondly, even assuming identical preferences these can differ from the usual CES type 
preferences for variety. As has been suggested by Ottaviano et al (2000), working with a 
quasi-linear utility with quadratic sub-utility function can bring better insight and makes 
things more easily to handle at an analytical level. A very popular specification in 
industrial organization, international trade and demand literature is the quadratic utility 
model (Dixit, 1979; Vives, 1990; Anderson et al. 1995; Philips, 1983): 
 



















This leads to linear demands for varieties i ∈[0,n] in region f produced in region k: 
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where Pf is an index of prices as in the original core-periphery model. With these 
functions income effects are ignored and consequently the importance of this effect can 




Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), production of a quantity x(k) of any variety k 
requires the same fixed (α) and variable (βx(k)) quantities of the production input in any 
region. As in Venables(1996) the production input in manufacturing can be modeled as a 
Cobb-Douglas composite of labor and an aggregate of intermediaries. Following 
Either(1982), all industrial goods enter symmetrically into the intermediate aggregate 
with a constant elasticity of substitution across varieties σ (>1). The price index of the 
aggregate of industrial goods used by firms is region-specific, and is defined by 
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  14where pi(h) is the producer price of variety h in region i. Shipments of the industrial 
goods incur in ‘iceberg’ trade costs: τ (>1) units must be shipped in order that one unit 
arrives in the other region. 
 
An industrial firm producing quantity x(h) of variety h in region i have a minimum cost 
function: 
 
)) ( ( ) (
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where µ (with 0≤µ<1) is the share of intermediaries in firms’ costs. 
 
Final Product Supply 
 
At the production level, we can also extend the model including more than one type of 
factor of production. Including capital raises questions about investment and convergence 
between regions, and its possible relationship with increased quality of transport 
infrastructure. It can also handle issues as taxes on different types of inputs and public 
expenditures.  
 
Additionally the way in which producers interact is very important to determine results as 
already studied in a partial equilibrium framework by Newbery (1998). Dealing with 
strategic behavior at a production level is a significant extension not only in terms of 
technical difficulty but also as a way of prospective important source of indirect effects. 
Departing from (17) –and working in a discrete environment- we can derive more general 
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In (30), if we assume a symmetric market when the number of firms increases the 
elasticity reduces in it second component. In the limit, when we assume “large number” 
  15of monopolistic competitors taking n to infinitive, si tends to zero and then we are in the 
typical case in the literature where σ ε = r . 
 
In producers compete in quantities instead that on prices (Cournot competition) then 
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We arrive to a similar expression for the elasticity (32) that also converges to σ if we take 
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Equations (30) and (32) are important if we want to model strategic behavior between 
producers as it was emphasized by Newbery (1998) when addressing the same issue as in 
this paper but in a partial equilibrium framework. Generally, oligopolistic interaction 
within the Dixit-Stiglitz framework implies simultaneous solution of mark-ups and 
market shares, and this can hardly complicated the solution procedure (Venables, et al 
2003). One special case that has been studied in the literature of trade and foreign direct 
investment is when cournot competition and products are perfect substitutes, so σ → ∞, 













The introduction of urban cost is possible mainly by introducing congestion and 
commuting cost. Congestion costs discourage agglomeration in any one region, and can 
be introduced explicitly or implicitly. The later is done assuming that due to those costs, 
the effective labor force as a fraction of the total labor force in a region falls when the 
size of the labor force grows, that is, the larger the labor force in a region, the less 
effective labor each worker in that region can supply. Let Zi be the effective labor force 
and Lj be the actual force in region j, so that∑ =
N
n nj l
1 , and then the effective labor force is 
defined as: 
 
) 1 ( j j j L L Z γ − =  
 
for region j=1,2, where γ is some positive parameter. Total income in region j will be the 
wage rate multiplied by the amount of effective labor that is supplied, that is, Y .  j j j Z w =
  16Krugman and Elizondo (1996) provide explicit derivation of this equation. They model 
congestion costs as the cost of commuting from a geographically large city to a central 
business district where everyone works. The larger the city, the more time workers at the 
edge of the city must spend getting to and from the center of the city. 
 
 
Alternatively as stressed by Brakman et al (1996), one can include negative feedbacks 
(the cost components α and/or β r i s e  i f  n j  increases) because clustering of economic 
activity causes congestion, long travel time, high cost of establishment, etc. The 
production structure can be easily adapted to introduce congestion costs in this way. The 
main idea is that the congestion costs that each firm faces depend on the overall size of 
the location of production. The size of city r is measured by the total number of 
manufacturing firms’ nr in that city. Congestion costs are thus not industry or firm 
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Where lir is the amount of labor required in city r to produce xir units of a variety, and 
the parameter t represents external economies of scale. There are no location-specific 
external economies of scale if t = 0. There are positive location-specific external 
economies if –1 < t < 0. Such a specification could be used to model, for example, 
learning-by-doing spillovers. For our present purposes, the case of negative location 
specific external economies arising from congestion are relevant, in which case 0 < t < 1. 
 
In most of the literature it is assumed that agglomeration of workers into a single region 
does not involve costs (e.g. congestion). The core-periphery model can be extended by 
adding urban costs. Following Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2000) each agglomeration 
has a spatial extension that imposes commuting and land costs on the corresponding 
workers. Space can be then continuous and one-dimensional assuming that each region 
has a spatial extension and involves a linear city whose center is given but with a variable 
size. The city center stands for a central business district (CBD) in which all firms locate 
once they have chosen to set up in the corresponding region. Housing is then a new good 
described by the amount of land used by workers who became urban residents that must 
commute to their jobs.  
 
Modeling Transport Costs 
 
Transportation costs can be modeled in the familiar “iceberg” way, such that a portion of 
the good is consumed by the process of transporting it.  However, transportation cost can 
at the same time be subject to increasing returns. Following Mansori (2003) it can be 
assumed that in each period a fixed cost must be incurred before the transport of goods 
between two regions can take place (e.g construction and maintenance of a highway, 
airport, railway line, or port).  Once this periodic fixed cost has been paid, there is then an 
additional marginal cost to transportation. The constant marginal cost of shipping one 
unit from region i to region j is τij>0. Then the total cost of shipping all goods from i to j 
is:  
  17 
ij ij ij ij V F TC τ + =  
 
where Fij is the fixed cost of establishing and maintaining the transportation infrastructure 
and TCij is the total cost of transporting a quantity of goods Vij between regions i and j. 
Since a competitive transportation industry is not possible then it can be assumed that the 
government runs this industry. Average cost pricing is the charging rule, and this is just 
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Then iceberg type cost can be represented by: 
 
ij ij AC + =1
* τ  
 
In this formulation F represents the degree of increasing returns to scale in transport. 
 
Another way of extending the modeling of transport cost is following Berhens et al 
(2003), in a model of two countries with two regions within each country. They argue 
that “it is a well-established fact that international transport costs are lower on routes 
processing larger volumes of freight. In this section, we assume that trade costs τ are 
affected by the spatial distribution of firms in the two countries as observed in reality”. 
More precisely, , it is assume that 
 
τ (λH, λF) = τ [1 - ξ(λH + λF - 1)]  
 
where ξ ∈ [0, 1] is an indicator of the degree of density economies in transportation and τ 
≤ τ trade (the level of international transport costs that leads to trade between countries). 
When both countries are dispersed (λH  =  λF  = 1/2), we have τ  (λH,  λF) = τ  ,while 
international trade costs drop to (1-ξ)τ , which can be interpreted as the incompressible 
component of trade costs, when both countries are agglomerated. For ξ = 0, there are no 
economies of transport density. 
 
Finally, non-linearities in transport cost can be also captured as in Lanaspa and Sanz 
(2001). They use a specific function that relates transport cost with population, based on 
empirical work. 
 
Multi-region and Networks 
 
The multi region case can be analyzed in several ways. Starting with an extension to three 
regions as in Martin and Rogers (1999), infrastructure improvement can be analyzed in a 
context of intraregional trade along with interregional trade, differentiated between costs 
incurred in the each of these cases.  Brakman et al (2003) also analyze the discrete case 
with what they call the “package” economy,  a discrete version of the “racetrack” model 
as appeared in Krugman and Venables (1995b). 
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Turning to the transport cost function in a multi-region setting, unit transport costs from 
locations x to y can be decompose: 
 
) ( ) , ( y x T y x − ≡τ τ   
 
where τ is the amplitude of transportation costs and where T(x) captures the shape of 
transportation costs. As in Picard and Tabuchi (2003), the function T(x) : R → [0,1] is a 
periodic function such that T(x) = T(l+x) = T(l-x) for every l ∈ℵ (set of natural 
numbers), and such that T(0) = 0, T(1/2) = 1, and T’(x) ≥ 0 for every x ∈[0,1/2]. 
 
The network issue can be also approached within the framework of Ago et al (2004) in 
the context of three regions located on a line. 
 
 
V.  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
In this paper we tried to fill a gap in research concerning cost-benefit analysis for 
transport infrastructure projects. The gap arises when comparing recent theoretical and 
empirical modeling relating traditional CBA with economy-wide welfare measures 
arising from transport initiatives. Departing from the canonical core-periphery modeling 
we construct measures of welfare and linked them with the practice of CBA. Simulations 
based on symmetry and asymmetry conditions in this model show that a difference exists 
in both measures and that this measure is negative and increases significantly in the case 
of asymmetry and more particularly when more realistic features are included in the 
model. This evidence support the interest in more detailed research on indirect and 
strategic effects arising from infrastructure projects in the debate that originated studies 
such as SACTRA (1999) and CPB(2000).  
 
In a future extension of this paper more realistic features are considered such as networks 
effects (more than two regions), imperfect and heterogeneous labor markets, government 















  19VI. Appendix 
 
A.I. Welfare  Measures 
 
Welfare measures for comparison between a general CBA and a traditional –specific- 
CBA are the following: 
 
•  Consumer Surplus (CS) 
•  Compensate Variation (CV) 
•  Equivalent Variation (EV) 
 
CS is measured in two different ways. First it can be measure using “rule of half” type 
procedure, which means that in both the original and final equilibrium the levels of 
demand in region i fulfilled with production from region j, that is manufactures goods 
using transport services, are computed. Next, the following formula is applied using as a 
measure of “prices” the level of transportation plus one (τ) cost in each equilibrium: 
 
) )( (
1 0 1 0 τ τ − + = ij ij ij ROH D D s CS         ( A . 1 )  
 
In this formula si represents the proportion of manufacture workers staying in region i, or 
more appropriate the proportion of varieties from region j consumed in region i. It must 
be used as a weight in the calculation of CS for a particular region since the consumer 
surplus refers to the total gain in welfare arising from the consumption of transport sector 
using goods. In this measure no difference between agricultural or manufacture workers 
in done. 
 
CS can also be measure directly from the expression of demand for variety j consumed in 
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         ( A . 2 )  
 
The integration of this expression over the corresponding range of levels of τ and 
subsequently weighted by s gives another measure of CS that should be consistent with 
the first one is the demand curve is not very far from the linear case. For the purpose of 
integration I use two numerical integration procedures that in general give close results; 
these are Trapezoid rule and Simpson rule. These calculations can be carried out for the 
symmetry case since between equilibriums only τ is changing.  This occurs because of 
the normalizations employed requires that prices are one in equilibrium (and equal to 
salaries for manufacture workers) in both scenarios an as a consequence expenditure is 
equal in both regions and since the equilibriums analyzed are for dispersion we have ni  = 
nj = 0.5. This means that the movement in over the demand curve and doesn’t affect the 
position of the demand curve. This is completely different to what happen when 
asymmetry between regions is allowed. In this case not only τ changes, but other 
  20elements in the expression for demand change so we can not use anymore the second 
approach to calculate CS. 
 
CV and EV measures are derived from the expression of indirect utility for the aggregate 
of consumers in a region. This expression for region r is the following: 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 (
, ) ( ) 1 ( ) , (
µ µ µ µ µ µ
− − − − − =
T T
r p G Y Y G p V       ( A . 3 )  
 
The following two relations implicitly define an expression for the equivalent (EV) and 
compensate (CV) variations, 
 
1 0 0 ) , ( U EV Y V = + τ  
 
0 1 1 ) , ( U CV Y V = − τ  
 
where U
i  indicate the level of utility depending on the stage, that is, in the original 
situation before the change in transport cost and in the final situation after the change. 
Combining these conditions with (3) a pair of explicit expressions for the EV and CV can 
be derived, for example, for the equivalent variation, 
 
) 1 ( 0 0 ) 1 ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
µ µ µ µ µ µ
− − − − + − =
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r p G EV Y U  
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CV and EV measures can also be derived from the compensate demand function for 
variety i, which can be obtained starting from the FOC of the utility maximization faced 
by the consumer in this version of the core-periphery model, that is,  
Maximization of U  subject to Y ,  ,
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  21where M represents the composite index of manufacture goods, T is the consumption of 
traditional good (e.g. agricultural), and µ represents the expenditure share of 
manufactured good in consumption. The consumption of manufactures is described by a 
constant elasticity of substitution sub utility function defined over a continuum of 
varieties of manufactured goods, m(i), with a range of varieties described by n. The 

















r r di i m M      with    0 > σ  >  1     (A.6) 
 
Since all consumers are identical in preferences, final demand for an specific variety will 
be the same for all of them differing only in terms of sources of income. We can also 
assume that there is a representative consumer in each region meaning that the relevant 
income includes all sources of wages in a region, that is, manufacture or traditional 
production based wages
12. The utility maximization problem can be solved in two steps. 
First, for any value of the composite M, each m(i) have to be chosen so as to minimize 
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r r di i m M      (A.7) 
 
The first order condition for this expenditure minimization problem establish the equality 
of marginal rates of substitution to price ratios for any pair of varieties and consequently 
implies an expression for the consumption of a particular variety (e.g. m(j)), that   
replaced in the constraint in (4) finally brings an expression for the compensated demand 
of this particular variety as in (5), 
 































          ( A . 8 )  
 
The term in the denominator is normally regarded as a price index for the manufactured 
products, denoted here by G in (9). This index measures the minimum cost of purchasing 

































r r di i p di i p G       ( A . 9 )  
                                                 
12 See Mas-Colell et al (1997) Ch. 4 for a discussion on aggregation.* 
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In a second stage we can solve the original problem of utility maximization, where 
consumers divide total income between traditional and composite manufactures. This is a 
typical Cobb-Douglas maximization problem leading to uncompensated demands in the 
form of income over price times the expenditure share of the good in total consumption, 
like in (9).   
 
µ µ − =
1 max r r r T M U   subject to  G       r r
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For each variety of manufactures uncompensated demand can be derived as in (2), in 
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To derive compensate demand expression for variety I, instead of using Mr we should use 
the corresponding compensate demand expression for the aggregate of manufactures, M
c. 
Since the original consumer maximization problem is a typical Cobb-Douglas, the 









where Er correspond to the expenditure function that can be derived directly from (3) as, 
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One important property of this function is that it coincides with (9) in the initial 
equilibrium if the EV is used as a reference of welfare and it coincides with the final 
equilibrium if CV is used instead. In the case of asymmetry this kind of measure cannot 
be used since from equilibrium to equilibrium variables other than τ change. 
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